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INTRODUCTION
“From time to time a criminal case arises for which current laws
do not seem to ‘fit’ the elements of the case. When that happens, it can
be difficult for prosecutors to find a charge that can be supported by
the evidence and that will carry an appropriate punishment.” 1
Such a situation in which current laws do not fit the case’s facts
recently occurred in Gloucester, Virginia. On April 28, 2011, while
knocking on doors during a routine robbery investigation, members
of the Gloucester County Sheriff’s Department made a startling
discovery at the home of Brian and Shannon Gore in Gloucester
County, Virginia.2 As police moved from room to room, they found
a fully decorated child’s room.3 That room was for the Gores’ son.4
Police discovered another room that appeared to be for storage.5
The room was dark and full of boxes.6 In the room, there was also a
crib topped with a heavy piece of wood and several large boxes
acting as a lid.7 Inside that makeshift cage, a naked little girl
reached out from behind its bars.8 She “was whimpering, grunting,
and making animalistic noises.”9 Officers found the girl crouched
with her knees pressed against her chest and her heels touching her
1. MICH. HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, FIRST ANALYSIS: PROHIBIT TORTURE, HOUSE BILL 5268,
5269 (2005) (discussing and analyzing Michigan’s law regarding torture).
2. Russell Goldman, Virginia Parents Accused of Murder, Keeping Starving Child in
Cage, ABC NEWS (May 4, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/virginia-parents-accused-murder-
keeping-starving-child-cage/story?id=13528448 [http://perma.cc/6RW8-948R]; Matt Sabo,
Court Documents Reveal Details in Gloucester Caged Girl Case, DAILY PRESS (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://articles.dailypress .com/2013-03-04/news/dp-nws-gore-appeal-0305-20130304_1_
shannon-gore-brian-gore-documents [http://perma.cc/UVG2-G2SR].
3. See Kim Robins, Gores Sentenced to 30 Years on Child Abuse Charges, GLOUCESTER-
MATHEWS GAZETTE-J. (June 10, 2013), http://gazettejournal.net/index.php/news_article/gores_
sentenced_to_30_years_on_child_abuse_charges [http://perma.cc/7UCP-CHFS]; Sabo, supra
note 2.
4. Sabo, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id. 
7. Robins, supra note 3.
8. See id. 
9. Id. 
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buttocks.10 Several inches of feces lined the interior of the cage.11
The child was so starved that she had resorted to eating her own
skin.12
She had sustained severe injuries. The six-year-old weighed just
fifteen pounds—the size of a six-month-old baby.13 Her head was the
size of a three-year-old child’s, and she could not extend her legs due
to long-term confinement and malnutrition.14 Open sores covered
her heels and buttocks as a result of remaining in the same position
for long durations of time.15 Because her confinement deprived her
brain of essential nutrients during key developmental stages, she
suffered permanent brain damage.16 Later testing indicated that the
girl, now close to nine years old, would never be able to live indepen-
dently and would always suffer from emotional and psychological
challenges.17 Neither Brian nor Shannon Gore could explain why
they had caged and starved their child.18 From police interviews and
trial testimony, however, it became clear that the Gores’ actions
went beyond mere child abuse.
For months, possibly years, the girl’s parents imprisoned their
child in the makeshift cage in the back of their home, allegedly to
conceal her existence. No one knew that the couple had a baby girl.19
At first, the Gores left the child in the cage when they were at work
and took her out when they returned home.20 Eventually, however,
the Gores grew increasingly unconcerned about taking her out of the
cage, so much so that she remained confined in the cage for long
10. Id.; Sabo, supra note 2.
11. See Sabo, supra note 2.
12. Goldman, supra note 2.
13. Joanne Kimberlin, Gloucester Residents In Dark as Child Abuse Came to Light,
PILOTONLINE.COM (June 5, 2011), http://hamptonroads.com/2011/06/gloucester-residents-dark-
child-abuse-came-light [http://perma.cc/E28F-D9RF]; Robins, supra note 3.
14. Robins, supra note 3; Sabo, supra note 2.
15. Goldman, supra note 2; Kimberlin, supra note 13.
16. See Robins, supra note 3.
17. Id. 
18. See id.; Lena Sullivan, Virginia Parents Brian and Shannon Gore Arrested as Starved
6-Year-Old Found Caged, GA. NEWSDAY (May 3, 2011), http://www.georgianewsday.com/news/
national/67640-virginia-parents-brian-and-shannon-gore-arrested-as-starved-6-year-old-
found-caged.html [http://perma.cc/SZ6S-JBZE].
19. Kimberlin, supra note 13.
20. Robins, supra note 3.
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periods of time.21 Brian Gore stated that he and his wife fed the
child sporadically and sometimes he would leave her a Pop-Tart.22
When asked why they stopped feeding their child, Brian Gore said
that he and his wife were tired of “[her] and it was easier to deal
with [her] this way.”23 They recognized that eventually the child
would get sick and die.24
A grand jury could not successfully indict the Gores on attempted
murder charges because they periodically fed the child.25 After
searching for applicable statutes under which to charge the Gores,
the prosecutor charged them with aggravated child abuse—a felony
with a 10-year maximum term of imprisonment26—and aggravated
malicious wounding, which is punishable by up to life in prison.27
The Gores pled guilty to both charges and the judge sentenced them
to thirty years in prison—ten years for aggravated child abuse and
twenty years for aggravated malicious wounding.28 However, had
the child not suffered a permanent injury, which is one of the
elements of aggravated malicious wounding,29 the Gores would not
have faced the possibility of life in prison. Instead—assuming a
conviction for malicious wounding—the Gores would have faced a
maximum possible punishment of thirty years in prison (ten years
for child abuse and twenty years for malicious wounding).30 Given
that judges rarely issue the maximum sentence, it is likely that the
Gores would have received less than thirty years.31
21. Id.
22. Id. 
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The prosecution initially charged the Gores with attempted murder, but never
presented an indictment. Case Information, Commonwealth v. Gore, CR11000343-00, (Va.
Cir. Ct. March 10, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/TTG8-V6XN. The judge dismissed the
charges. Id.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (West 2014).
27. Id. § 18.2-51.2.
28. Sabo, supra note 2.
29. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-51 (malicious wounding), with § 18.2-51.2 (aggravated
malicious wounding).
30. See sources cited supra notes 26-27.
31. See sources cited supra notes 26-27. As this Note was headed for publication, the
Gores were also indicted for the murder of their seven-month-old son, whose remains were
found buried under a shed behind the couple’s home. Andy Fox, Parents Charged with
Homicide Given Public Defenders, 10 WAVY.COM (May 27, 2014), http://wavy.com/2014/05/27/
mother-who-caged-daughter-now-charged-with-sons-murder [http://perma.cc/9FZU-MG58].
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This Note argues that Virginia should close a gap in its criminal
code by creating a new crime for when a perpetrator physically or
mentally tortures a victim. The recent case in Gloucester County
illustrates the deficiencies of Virginia’s criminal statutes. Although
the Gores subjected their baby daughter to unspeakable physical
and mental suffering through acts that amount to nothing less than
torture, Virginia’s criminal laws do not specifically address this type
of conduct. When situations like these arise, prosecutors struggle to
find crimes that meet the facts of the case and provide adequate
punishment.
Most academic work on torture law has focused on international
laws, particularly laws that pertain to the treatment of enemy
combatants.32 Although this Note will reference and analyze
international torture laws as well as federal torture laws, it
predominantly focuses on state laws that address torture. Part I of
this Note will provide a broad overview of torture laws across the
United States. Part II will examine the different elements of state
torture laws, with particular focus on the differing approaches to
torture under Michigan’s and California’s torture statutes. In that
section, this Note will argue that any torture statute should include
mental and physical suffering, and unlike California’s torture
statute, motive should not be an element of the crime of torture
because it needlessly restricts prosecutors and fails to cover all
instances of torture. Part III draws upon state torture laws in
creating a model state torture statute. Part IV addresses constitu-
tional concerns with torture laws and argues that the model torture
statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Finally, Part V applies the
model torture statute to Gore.
32. See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 329 (1994); Oona A. Hathaway et al.,
Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to Torture Under International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J.
INT’L L. 791, 797-98 (2009) (arguing that international and U.S. torture laws require the same
mens rea); Rebecca B. Schechter, Note, Intentional Starvation as Torture, 18 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 1233, 1257 (2003) (contending that international law should recognize starvation as
torture); Sarah H. St. Vincent, Note, Coercion’s Common Threads: Addressing Vagueness in
the Federal Criminal Prohibitions on Torture by Looking to State Domestic Violence Laws, 109
MICH. L. REV. 813, 817-18 (2011) (arguing that federal criminal torture laws are vague and
should be revised to prohibit specific forms of mistreatment).
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I. TORTURE LAWS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES
Torture is a familiar subject under international and federal law.
In 1994, the United States ratified the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment
(CAT)—a treaty that requires state parties to “ensure that all acts
of torture are offences under [their] criminal law[s].”33 The United
States subsequently enacted the “Torture Act.”34 Much of the
scholarly debate on torture focuses on the interpretation and utility
of these laws.35 However, at the state level, a fairly robust statutory
framework addresses torture. Many states mention torture in their
homicide laws.36 In California, for example, “[a]ll murder which is
perpetrated by means of ... torture ... is murder of the first degree.”37
The Arizona Supreme Court also held that murder by torture is a
type of first-degree murder “committed when the defendant intends
to cause extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or some other untoward propensity.”38 The
New York aggravated murder statute identifies murder committed
in the course of torture.39 According to the statute, first-degree
murder includes instances in which “the defendant acted in an
especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of conduct
intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior to the
victim’s death.”40
Another common statutory framework is the inclusion of torture
as an aggravating factor for enhanced sentencing when a murder
33. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
available at http://perma.cc/E68J-A99Q [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. 
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012). 
35. See supra note 32.
36. Suzanna Tlapula & Amanda Appelbaum, Criminal Justice and Child Protection
Responses to Cases of Severe Child Abuse: Existing Statutory Frameworks for Torture, NAT’L
CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE (National District Attorneys Association), November
1, 2011, at 2, available at http://perma.cc/SL84-KK44.
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2012).
38. Tlapula & Appelbaum, supra note 36, at 2 (citing State v. Morales, 630 P.2d 1015,
1019 (Ariz. 1981)). 
39. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.26-125.27 (McKinney 2014).
40. Id. 
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includes acts of torture.41 Many states name torture as an aggravat-
ing factor for capital punishment.42 Virginia is one of these states,
but Virginia does not define torture.43 In fact, of the twenty states
that include torture as an aggravating factor for capital punish-
ment, only Arkansas,44 New York,45 and Wyoming46 specifically
define torture.
Many jurisdictions also include torture in their child abuse
statutes.47 For example, in the District of Columbia, a person
commits the crime of cruelty to children in the first degree if that
person “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortures ... a child
under 18 years of age ... and thereby causes bodily injury.”48
Despite international treaties and federal laws criminalizing
torture that does not result in death, California and Michigan are
the only two states that have specific anti-torture statutes.49 These
two statutes—as well as federal and international torture laws—
provide a point of reference for defining torture. As will be discussed
below, this Note will analyze the elements of these statutes to
formulate a precise yet workable definition of torture that will
provide prosecutors with an effective tool to combat an especially
horrible crime. 
II. THE ELEMENTS OF TORTURE
A. Mens Rea: Intent, Purpose, and Knowledge
The driving force behind the California torture statute is the idea
that the mindset of a torturer is particularly dangerous and
therefore deserving of additional punishment.50 In California,
torture is a specific intent crime, meaning the perpetrator must
41. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2014). 
42. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (West 2014).
43. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (West 2014).
44. Tlapula & Appelbaum, supra note 36, at 2 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604). 
45. Id. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.26-125.27 (McKinney 2014)).
46. Id. (citing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2014)). 
47. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-20 (2014).
48. D.C. CODE § 22-1101 (2014). 
49. Tlapula & Appelbaum, supra note 36, at 2 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2014);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.85 (West 2014)). 
50. See People v. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739, 746 (Ct. App. 2004).
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intend to inflict the physical effects suffered by the victim.51 Intent
is generally inferred from actions that demonstrate the perpetrator
did not merely intend to injure or kill the victim, but also wanted
the victim to suffer. Actions courts typically consider as evidence of
the specific intent to torture include, but are not limited to:
inflicting multiple blows to vulnerable body parts, cutting or
burning the victim, restraining the victim, moving the victim, and
inflicting injuries upon the victim after he or she is incapacitated.52
Although the California courts stress that the focus should not be on
the injuries the victim suffered, but rather on the actions of the
defendant, courts do look at the victim’s injuries to establish
intent.53 Other circumstantial evidence, including statements by the
defendant that show the defendant’s callous disregard for the
victim’s suffering, are also probative of intent.54 
Michigan’s mens rea standard includes the intent to cause either
physical pain or mental pain.55 In reality, this distinction is slight.
Mental pain usually flows from the infliction of physical pain.56
Upon finding that the victim suffered a mental injury, courts
usually infer that the accused intended to inflict mental pain by
51. “Every person who, with the intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the
purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose, inflicts great bodily
injury ... upon the person of another, is guilty of torture.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (emphasis
added); see also People v. Baker, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that section
206 requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator acted with the
specific “intent to cause cruel and extreme pain and suffering”).
52. People v. Assad, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that defendant acted
with the intent to inflict cruel pain when he repeatedly struck his son in the front, back, and
sides of his torso after his son had already suffered injuries to the same regions of his body);
People v. Misa, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that defendant intended to
cause cruel pain when he struck victim in the head repeatedly over significant period of time
and displayed callous indifference to the victim’s obvious need for medical attention); People
v. Baker, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 318-19 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that defendant intended to
cause his wife extreme pain when he poured gasoline on her, set her on fire, and then idly sat
by and watched her burn). 
53. People v. Burton, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 2006) (“A jury may consider the
severity of the wounds in determining whether the defendant intended to torture.”). 
54. People v. Quintero, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 893-94 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that evidence
that defendant repeatedly attacked victim’s face with a knife and made taunting remarks
indicated that defendant acted with the purpose to cause cruel suffering). 
55. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.85 (West 2014). 
56. Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNHCHR, at 45 (1999),
available at http://perma.cc/E32T-A9F7.
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physically injuring the victim.57 It is possible, however, to torture
through purely or predominantly psychological means. For example,
in People v. Murphy, the court inferred from the perpetrators’
actions that they intended to inflict mental pain and suffering.58 The
perpetrators bound and injured the victims, threatened to cause
bodily injury with golf clubs, knives, and guns, and even informed
the victims that one of the intruders had killed before and would kill
again if the victims did not comply with their demands.59 Although
they did not suffer significant physical injuries, all four victims
testified that they suffered negative long-term mental effects
because of the incident.60 This was sufficient to support a finding
that the perpetrators acted with the requisite intent.61 
Besides threats of physical harm, other forms of mental torture
often include limiting the victim’s access to sensory stimuli and
threatening sexual assault.62 As will be discussed below, the mental
effects of torture are often just as severe, if not worse than the
physical effects.63 Consequently, because the torturer often intends
to inflict psychological pain, any definition of torture must include
a mental component in its standard.
California also includes the additional element of motive in its
torture statute.64 California defines torture as the intentional
infliction of extreme pain and suffering “for the purpose of revenge,
extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.”65 California courts
have held that the purpose requirement is what distinguishes
torture from aggravated assault.66 The legislature interpreted
torture as the product of a “calculating and cold blooded individual
whose motivation for personal gain or satisfaction is deserving of
57. People v. Murphy, No. 293385, 2010 WL 4679582, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2010).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See infra Part II.D. 
63. See infra Part II.D.
64. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2014); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2014)
(including a motive element); State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576, 588 (N.C. 1997) (holding that
torture within the meaning of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2014) requires that the defendant act
for the “purpose of punishment, persuasion, or sadistic pleasure”). 
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (emphasis added).
66. People v. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739, 746 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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additional punishment.”67 Despite this fairly exacting mens rea
standard, the state does not need to show that the torturer premedi-
tated his actions.68
It is easy to imagine instances in which the defendant tortures his
victim for the purpose of revenge (the jealous boyfriend punishing
his cheating girlfriend), extortion (a thief trying to extract the
combination to a safe), or persuasion (a gang member pumping a
rival gang member for information), but it is the last enumerated
purpose—any sadistic purpose—that has proven more difficult to
define. Although many people associate sadistic pleasure with
sexual activity, California courts have adopted a broader definition,
interpreting “sadistic” purpose under the torture statute to mean
“the infliction of pain on another person for the purpose of experi-
encing [personal] pleasure.69
In practice, the California courts use “sadistic purpose” as a catch-
all phrase that allows the state to prove the necessary purpose
requirement when the defendant engages in especially disturbing
acts and there is little other evidence pointing to another enumer-
ated motive. For example, in People v. Pre, the defendant—a
complete stranger—broke into a woman’s house, viciously attacked
her, choked her into unconsciousness twice, and then bit her ear
while she was unconscious.70 With little evidence pointing to other
motives, the court inferred that the defendant acted with a sadistic
purpose when he bit the victim’s ear. “This evidence showed that the
defendant did not just engage in assault but had a separate sadistic
purpose when he bit the victim’s ear.”71 In response to the dissent’s
argument that the assailant’s conduct was not sufficiently “violent
and callous” to constitute torture when compared to the actions of
the defendant in People v. Singleton72—the case that inspired the
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 743. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 741. 
71. Id. at 746. 
72. 169 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Ct. App. 1981). In Singleton the defendant kidnapped and sexually
abused his victim, then chopped off her hand and dumped her in a ditch. Id. The defendant
was then later paroled after serving only seven years.  See People v. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739,
746 (Ct. App. 2004) (Benke, J., dissenting) (citing Singleton, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 335). Id. The
crime of torture was included in Proposition 115 to ensure that such heinous crimes received
a minimum punishment of life in prison. Id. (interpreting the legislative intent behind the
2014] TORTURED PROSECUTING 279
California legislature to pass the torture statute—the majority
reiterated that the purpose of “additional punishment ... is not
based on the ... presence of extreme violence, since extreme violence
may exist in circumstances involving other conduct such as an
explosion of violence .... Rather, ... the additional punishment is
imposed because the defendant’s intent to inflict pain for a sadistic
purpose is deserving of additional punishment.”73 The idea that the
focus should be on the defendant’s intent, and that factual compari-
sons of levels of violence and suffering to other cases offer little
value to this analysis, is heavily ingrained in California precedent.74 
At first blush, adding a purpose requirement to the definition of
torture may seem like the right approach. After all, Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture states that to constitute torture the
accused must inflict severe pain upon the victim for a prohibited
purpose.75 However, several countervailing reasons counsel against
such an approach. First, the requirement “that an act of torture
have an illegal purpose implies either that torture done with no
purpose or torture done with a legal purpose is somehow legiti-
mate.”76 Such a dubious proposition may explain why courts
applying international anti-torture law—which includes a purpose
requirement similar to California—rarely focus on the purpose
requirement.77 Most likely this is because “the purpose requirement
could be viewed as a dangerous limitation, resulting in intentional
government sponsored severe suffering failing to constitute
torture.”78 Second, in the international community, there is a strong
sentiment that the prohibition of torture “seems more than any
passage of section 206). 
73. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 746 (citation omitted). 
74. See People v. Hale, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 904, 913 (Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting argument that
evidence was insufficient because defendant’s acts were not as bad as those in other torture
cases); People v. Jung, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 9 (Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that “other victims of
torture may have suffered more than the victim in this case sheds no light on the sufficiency
of the evidence of defendant’s intent to cause ... severe pain and suffering”); People v. Barrera,
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 406 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting argument that the assailant’s conduct
needs to be sufficiently similar to that of the defendant in Singleton). 
75. Convention Against Torture, supra note 33, at art. 1. 
76. Schechter, supra note 32, at 1257. 
77. Copelon, supra note 32, at 327 & n.136.
78. Schechter, supra note 32, at 1257 n.137. The “Torture Memos,” as discussed below,
are perfect examples of the dangerous effect that a purpose requirement can have on
government policy making concerning torture. See infra 83-84 and accompanying text.
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other human right to be judicially accepted” as a norm that cannot
be abrogated, even during times of national emergency.79 If a state
actor is never justified in using torture, then surely the same applies
to a private actor. With this in mind, the purpose requirement looks
more like a meaningless, albeit potentially dangerous, statutory
construction meant to provide the statute with a superficial
appearance of being different. The California courts’ interpretations
of the torture statute, in which they proclaimed that there are only
two elements to torture, illustrates the questionable utility of the
purpose requirement: “Torture has two elements: (1) infliction of
great bodily injury on another, and (2) the specific intent to cause
cruel or extreme pain and suffering for revenge, extortion, persua-
sion, or any sadistic purpose.”80
Of course, motive is not completely irrelevant and should be
considered as evidence of the assailant’s intent. Michigan courts
follow this approach and take into account the assailant’s relation-
ship and past interactions with the victim when analyzing intent.81
By not having a purpose requirement, Michigan’s torture statute
avoids the pitfalls of the California statute.
However, Michigan’s mens rea standard is not without its faults.
Although Michigan does not require proof of motive, the accused
must act with the specific intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and
suffering.82 “Specific intent,” however, is a notoriously vague and
confusing term prone to accidental or intentional misinterpreta-
tion.83 Perhaps the most famous examples of this confusion are the
79. Schechter, supra note 32, at 1258 n.146; id. at 1259 (“The purpose requirement of the
torture definition [under the CAT] repudiates this norm by implying that either government
abuse committed without a reason is not torture, or that government abuse carried out with
a legal purpose is permitted.”).
80. People v. Baker, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 317 (Ct. App. 2002).
81. See People v. Dabish, No. 301622, 2013 WL 4081028, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 13,
2013) (finding evidence that defendant was angry at the victim for a previous incident and
had called the victim a whore on previous occasions probative of defendant’s intent to torture). 
82. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.85 (West 2014) (“A person who, with the intent to cause
cruel or extreme physical or mental pain and suffering, inflicts great bodily injury or severe
mental pain or suffering upon another person within his or her custody or physical control
commits torture and is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of
years.”) (emphasis added); see People v. Lang, No. 308985, 2013 WL 4081154, at *4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Aug. 13, 2013) (holding that section 750.85 is a specific intent crime).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (noting the confusion sur-
rounding the terms “general intent” and “specific intent” that plagues the common law). In
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“Torture Memos” that advised the CIA and the Department of
Defense on the legality of enhanced interrogation techniques under
international and United States torture laws.84 Under international
law, torture is a specific intent crime. Article 1 of the Convention
Against Torture defines torture in part as “any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession.”85 As Oona Hathaway
points out in her article Tortured Reasoning, the mens rea standard
for torture under the CAT is somewhat confusing because torture
requires pain or suffering to be “intentionally inflicted on a person”
for a proscribed purpose.86 It is possible to conclude that the
“intentionally inflicted” requirement must meet the purposeful
intent standard—that it was the perpetrator’s conscious goal to
cause extreme pain—notwithstanding the prohibited purpose
requirement.87 However, based on the negotiating history of the 
CAT and subsequent international legal precedent, it is clear that
the accused must only “knowingly” inflict pain and suffering.88 In
other words, the perpetrator’s awareness that his conduct caused
extreme pain sufficiently satisfies the intent element.
The United States implemented its obligations under the CAT.89
Unfortunately, the definition of torture under the U.S. statute reads
quite differently as compared to the CAT’s definition. The U.S.
statute defines torture as “an act committed by a person acting
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical
or mental pain or suffering.”90 The purpose requirement is notice-
ably absent. The authors of the Torture Memos relied on this change
People v. Gould, 570 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) the court struggled to classify a law
that made it a crime to knowingly or intentionally cause serious physical or mental harm to
a child as requiring specific or general intent because the crime contained the word
“knowingly.”
84. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2349-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://perma.cc/
MDD9-S5HE [hereinafter Torture Memo].
85. Convention Against Torture, supra note 33, at art. 1.
86. Hathaway et. al., supra note 32, at 795.
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 803. 
89. Pub. L. 103-236, Title V, § 506(a), Apr. 30, 1994, 108 Stat. 463.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012) (emphasis added).
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when they concluded that for an act to constitute torture, “the
infliction of such pain must be the defendant’s precise objective.”91
In other words, a defendant would avoid prosecution if he know-
ingly, but not purposefully, inflicted severe physical pain on a
detainee.92
Academics have thoroughly debunked the statutory interpreta-
tion and legal reasoning of the Torture Memos.93 Regardless, the
main takeaway from this saga for Virginia—and other states that
may consider passing a torture statute—is the importance of
statutory clarity and specificity, particularly for the mens rea
standard. Vague terms such as “intent” leave room for potential
tightening or widening of the mens rea standard. Accordingly,
precise definitions of the mens rea standard are preferable.
The next question is determining the proper mens rea standard
for a state torture statute. Recognizing the inherent imprecision of
terms like “intent,”94 the drafters of the Model Penal Code devised
precise and helpful definitions for many of the possible mental
states.95 For example, a person acts “purposefully” as to a particular
result, if he consciously desires that result.96 By contrast, a person
acts “knowingly” if he is aware that that result is practically certain
to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that
result.97
For torture, knowledge is the appropriate mens rea standard.98 A
purpose standard fails to cover all foreseeable instances of torture.
Absent direct or overwhelming circumstantial evidence of the
accused’s subjective desire, this hurdle is difficult for the prosecu-
tion to overcome. A purposeful standard would not cover an
91. Torture Memo, supra note 84, at 3. 
92. Hathaway et al., supra note 32, at 795. 
93. Id. at 792. 
94. See generally United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980).
95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2012); Hathaway et al., supra note 32, at 201 n.40  (“[The
Code] establishes four levels of culpable criminal intent ranging, in order, from the most
culpable to the least culpable level; purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent.”) (quoting
FRANK AUGUST SCHUBERT, CRIMINAL LAW: THE BASICS 157 (2d ed. 2010)). 
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2012). 
97. Id. 
98. In Michigan, specific intent includes purpose or knowledge that the prohibited result
will occur. See People v. Spry, 254 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that specific
intent is the subjective desire or knowledge that the prohibited result will occur). 
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individual who through cowardice or convenience subjects someone
to torture. Gore is a perfect example of this situation. Based on the
totality of the facts and circumstances, a jury would likely conclude
that Mr. and Mrs. Gore thought that their child was either a burden
they did not want to bear, or that the child’s existence had to be
concealed.99 What started off as neglect or child abuse gradually
snowballed into torture as the Gores likely reasoned that it was
easier to continue starving and caging their child than to confront
the reality of the situation and accept the wrongfulness of their
actions. Although they most likely did not desire to make their child
suffer, the Gores were certainly aware that their actions were
having such an effect.
In essence, a knowledge mens rea standard would cover those
individuals who subject someone to acts of torture in an effort to
conceal a past crime. Here is an example: a boyfriend in a fit of rage
strikes his girlfriend, causing significant injury. To cover up his
crime, he locks her in his basement where she suffers pain from
dehydration and starvation. The boyfriend’s goal is to evade arrest,
not to cause cruel suffering. But in the process he has physically and
mentally harmed his girlfriend to the point of torture. Under a
purpose-based mens rea standard, it would be difficult to prosecute
the boyfriend for torture. However, under a knowledge standard,
this individual would almost certainly be convicted of torture. It is
slightly easier to prove that the individual was aware to a practical
certainty that his actions had the effect of torturing his victim.
Moreover, a knowledge standard does not water down the require-
ments to prove the crime. Someone who acts with knowledge as to
a particularly horrible result of his act does so with a very culpable
mental state.100 Furthermore, knowledge is still a high bar for
prosecutors to pass. Therefore, knowledge is the appropriate mens
rea standard.
99. See supra Introduction.
100. See supra note 95. 
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B. Cruel or Extreme Pain
Many jurisdictions include an analysis of pain in their definition
of torture. These jurisdictions specify the type of pain as extreme,
severe, grievous, or cruel.101 Both the California102 and Michigan103
statutes include this kind of language. Michigan’s statute even
provides a definition of “cruel:” “brutal, inhuman, sadistic, or that
which torments.”104 The statute, however, specifically states that
proof that “a victim suffered pain is not an element of the crime [of
torture].”105 California case law also makes clear that proof of pain
is not an element of the crime and that courts should not focus on
the pain experienced by the victim.106
 California and Michigan follow the correct approach by not
requiring proof of pain. Victims often lose consciousness and may be
unaware of what is happening to them.107 Nonetheless, the defen-
dant’s actions are just as heinous and deserving of punishment,
regardless of whether the victim is aware of the pain. In addition,
proof of pain would shift the focus from the defendant to the victim,
whereas criminal jurisprudence focuses on the actions and mindset
of the defendant.108 From a practical standpoint, pain is subjective
and difficult to quantify;109 it is better to focus on the actions of the
defendant. Juries can easily understand actions typically associated
with torture—burning, cutting, repeated blows, multiple puncture
wounds, dragging, scalding—and infer pain from those actions
without having to delve into testimonials from the victim about the
pain he or she experienced.110
101. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (West 2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2014);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2014); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17
(2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.26-125.27 (McKinney 2014). 
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206. 
103. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.316 (2014).
104. Id. 
105. Id.
106. People v. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739, 746 (Ct. App. 2004).
107. See, e.g., id.
108. See id. 
109. Of course the victim may testify about the pain he or she experienced, and this is a
relevant factor. 
110. See, e.g., supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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C. Temporal Requirement
Some jurisdictions, such as Arkansas and Idaho,111 require that
the infliction of pain occur for a “prolonged period of time.” In her
article about child torture, Mary Ahan also suggests that one of the
elements of torture should be “some protraction in time.”112 She
includes examples of torturous actions that would fulfill this
requirement: “a severe beating that continues for four hours or a
mother that burns her child with a cigarette every day for a
month.”113 A temporal requirement, however, adds a layer of
vagueness that is simply not necessary. How much time is neces-
sary? Thirty minutes, one hour, four hours, days, months? Although
it usually takes time to torture a person, torture can be completed
in a brief amount of time like many other violent crimes.114 It does
not, therefore, appear that protraction in time is a necessary ele-
ment of torture.115
Similar to protraction in time, other jurisdictions require that the
defendant engage in a course of conduct meant to cause the victim
extreme pain.116 The North Carolina Supreme Court defined “course
of conduct” as a “pattern of the same or similar acts, repeated over
a period of time, however short, which established that there existed
in the mind of the defendant a plan, scheme or design to inflict cruel
suffering upon another.”117 Other state statutes related to child
abuse that involve elements of torture require that the defendant
engage in a pattern of violent or abusive behavior.118 For example,
an Iowa Child Endangerment statute criminalizes any person who
has committed “three or more acts of child endangerment ... within
a period of twelve months involving the same child ... where one or
111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-604 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (West 2014).
112. Mary Ahan, A Road to Hope: The Path to Defining Child Torture to Protect the
Children, AM. U. CRIM. L. BRIEF 16, 16-17 (2009). 
113. Id. at 17. 
114. See, e.g., People v. Hale, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 904, 913 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that brevity
of defendant’s attack on victim does not preclude the defendant from harboring the requisite
intent for the offense of torture). 
115. Ahan, supra note 112, at 17.
116. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 406 S.E.3d 579, 589 (N.C. 1991). 
117. Tlapula & Appelbaum, supra note 36, at 3 (quoting Crawford, 406 S.E.3d at 589). 
118. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6A (West 2014). 
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more of the acts results in serious injury to the child.”119 Although
many instances of torture may consist of multiple acts carried out
over a prolonged period of time, this is not always the case. A single
act of poisoning, burning, or cruelly confining a person can consti-
tute torture if the other elements are present.120 Multiple acts or a
protraction in time, however, are important factors in proving other
elements of torture, namely the perpetrator’s intent to cause severe
pain or suffering.121
D. Physical and Mental Injuries
California’s torture statute requires the victim to sustain a
physical injury.122 To distinguish torture from lesser crimes, this
injury must be severe. In California, the victim must suffer “great
bodily injury,” which means “a significant or substantial physical
injury.”123 Typical examples of injuries that constitute great bodily
injury include broken bones, internal bleeding, stab wounds, severe
burns, gunshot wounds, and paralysis.124 Unlike other serious
crimes such as mayhem, which require a permanent injury, the
bodily harm under California’s torture statute does not have to be
a permanent, disabling, or disfiguring injury.125 In fact, California
courts have held that great bodily injury can include more moderate
injuries such as abrasions, lacerations and bruising.126 This rela-
tively low injury threshold requirement makes sense given that the
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 318 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that de-
fendant intended to cause his wife extreme pain when he set her on fire and watched her burn).
121. See, e.g., People v. Brockitt, No. 311042, 2013 WL 5379646, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept.
26, 2013) (holding that victim suffered great bodily injury, as defined by torture statute, when
his hands were bound behind his back for twelve to fourteen hours, cutting off circulation);
People v. Richmond, No. 289335, 2010 WL 334694, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010)
(inferring defendant’s intent from the following pattern of conduct: defendant inflicted a
severe head injury on the child victim, rubbed victim’s genitals, kissed him, smacked his
buttocks, threatened to rape him, and threw ice water on his stomach). 
122. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2014).
123. People v. Jung, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 9 (Ct. App. 1999). 
124. See, e.g., supra notes 52-54, 120-21. 
125. People v. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739, 743 (Ct. App. 2004).
126. Id. 
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California courts are especially concerned with the mindset of the
defendant.127
The Michigan torture statute defines “great bodily injury” with
greater specificity, and like the California statute, it does not require
that the physical injury be permanent.128 Also, the Michigan torture
law is one of the only statutes to include a mental component to
injury.129 A demonstration that the victim suffered great bodily
harm or “severe mental pain or suffering” as a result of the defen-
dant’s actions meets the injury requirement.130 The statute defines
severe mental pain or suffering as “a mental injury that results in
a substantial alteration of mental functioning that is manifested in
a visibly demonstrable manner.”131 Unlike with great bodily injury,
the statute goes on to specify that that the mental injury must
result from certain actions by the defendant: (1) “infliction or
threatened infliction of great bodily injury,” (2) “administration ... 
of mind-altering substances or procedures,” (3) “threat of imminent
death,” or (4) “threat that another person will imminently be
subjected to death.”132
Both Michigan and California take the correct approach in not
requiring the victim to sustain a permanent physical injury. Such
a requirement would only send a message to torturers to “cease the
act before they meet that level of physical injury.”133 Furthermore,
accepting that the torturer’s mindset is deserving of additional
punishment refutes the notion that the severity of the victim’s
wounds is determinative of the defendant’s intent to torture. Severe
wounds may result from an explosion of violence or an act of animal
fury rather than from the intent to inflict severe physical pain.134
California’s torture statute, however, offers an incomplete
definition of torture by not including mental pain and suffering.
Torture can be perpetrated through both physical and psychological
127. See supra Part II.B.
128. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.85 (West 2014).
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Ahan, supra note 112, at 17.
134. People v. Pre, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739, 743 (Ct. App. 2004).
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means.135 In reality, the distinction between physical and psycholog-
ical torture methods is often artificial.136 For example, sexual torture
causes both physical and psychological symptoms, even when there
has been no physical assault.137 At least one study shows that
“psychological and physical torture both have the same detrimental
effects on the survivor’s mental health, since both methods share
the same crucial feature: exposing a person to an uncontrollable and
unpredictable life-threatening situation of extreme stress.”138
One of the most common and debilitating psychological effects of
torture is Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).139 The main
symptoms of PTSD are flashbacks, severe anxiety, insomnia, and
hyperarousal.140 Other effects include depression, hallucinations,
paranoia, personality changes, and drug addiction.141 Typical symp-
toms of child victims include hypervigilance, the constant monitor-
ing of personal safety, helplessness, and separation anxiety.142
Clearly, the consequences of torture extend well beyond physical
pain. To fully account for the methods a torturer may utilize and the
injuries a victim may suffer, it is essential that any definition of
torture include both physical and psychological components.
E. Physical or Custodial Control
In practice it is impossible for a torturer to inflict extreme
physical or mental pain upon the victim without substantially
135. Rona M. Fields, The Neurobiological Consequences of Psychological Torture, in THE
TRAUMA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE 139 (Almerindo E. Ojeda ed., 2008).
136. Id. (“[Torture] of any type implies threat, fear, and powerlessness, all of which can and
often does impact on brain, spinal cord, and organ integrity and therefore has medical
consequences. Given the intricate mind-body connection known in science and philosophy ...
physical versus psychological is an irrelevant [distinction].”)
137. Claudia Catani et al., The Tortured Brain, in THE TRAUMA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
TORTURE, supra note 135, at 173, 184-85.
138. Id. at 175.
139. Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 56, at 28-29.
140. Id. at 46-47.
141. Id. at 47.
142. Ahan, supra note 112, at 16.
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curtailing the victim’s freedom.143 One of the key characteristics of
torture is the victim’s complete loss of self-autonomy:
Indeed, in an important sense the victim’s body and attendant
physical sensations cease to be his own instrument, but rather
have become the instrument of the torturer .... [T]he torturer is
able to heavily influence other aspects of the victim’s mental life,
including stream of consciousness ... [and] the victim can ...
think of little else but his extreme suffering and the torturer.144
It is the element of control that the torturer exercises over the
victim that differentiates torture from other crimes. Michigan’s
statute accounts for this by requiring that the victim be within the
physical or custodial control of the assailant.145 Classic examples of
physical control include instances in which the victim is tied up or
locked in a basement.146 It is important to interpret physical control
more broadly. Michigan defines “custody or physical control” as “the
forcible restriction of a person’s movements or forcible confinement
of the person so as to interfere with that person’s liberty, without
that person’s consent or without lawful authority.”147 This definition
of control covers assailants who utilize less conventional—but equal-
ly effective and dangerous—means of exercising dominion over the
victim. For example, in People v. Dabish, the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that the victim was within the defendant’s physical
control when he severely beat the victim, left her in his apartment
for three hours, and removed the batteries from all the phones in
the apartment.148 By confining the victim to his apartment with no
access to a phone to enable her to summon help or seek assistance,
the defendant had forcibly restricted or confined the victim.149
A broad definition of “custodial or physical control” is especially
beneficial to vulnerable classes of individuals such as children, the
143. Seumas Miller, Torture, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/torture [http://perma.cc/52H7-Q82Z]. 
144. Id. 
145. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.85 (West 2014).
146. See, e.g., People v. Brockitt, No. 311042, 2013 WL 5379646, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept.
26, 2013) (holding that defendant physically controlled the victim by tying victim’s hands). 
147. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.85.
148. No. 301622, 2013 WL 4081028, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2013). 
149. Id. 
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elderly, the sick, and the handicapped.150 In many instances the
torturer of these individuals is a parent, spouse, or care-
taker—someone whose relationship to the victim makes it easy for
him or her to exercise control over the victim and preclude outside
aid with the use of only minimal force.151
The Michigan torture law also imposes the additional require-
ment that the victim be forcibly restricted or confined “without that
person’s consent or without lawful authority.”152 The disjunctive
word “or” indicates a separation between two different alterna-
tives:153
In other words, the statute allows the conviction (1) of a defen-
dant who has lawful authority to forcibly restrict or confine the
victim if the victim does not consent to the restriction or
confinement, or (2) of a defendant who does not have lawful
authority to forcibly restrict or confine the victim, even if the
victim consents to the restriction or confinement.154
Consequently, the statute protects young children and other people
who may lack the capacity to consent. It also protects children who
fall victim to a parent’s excessive punishment that might constitute
torture.155 A parent has the constitutional right to punish his or her
child, but once that punishment becomes unreasonable the parent
no longer acts within his lawful authority; the parent becomes
subject to the penalties under the statute if the other elements of
torture are satisfied.156
III. MODEL TORTURE STATUTE
Based on the previous analysis, the definition of torture should
contain the following elements: (1) knowledge that one’s actions are
150. See, e.g., People v. Lachniet, No. 297836, 2011 WL 2859818, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July
19, 2011); People v. Schaw, 791 N.W.2d 743 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010); People v. Richmond, No.
289335, 2010 WL 334694, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010).
151. See, e.g., supra notes 148-50. 
152. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.85.
153. Id. 
154. People v. Brockitt, No. 311042, 2013 WL 5379646, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2013).
155. See, e.g., id. 
156. Id. 
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practically certain to cause cruel physical or mental pain and
suffering; (2) infliction of serious bodily or mental injury; (3) upon
another person within one’s custody or physical control. These
elements are embodied in the following model torture statute:
(1) A person, who inflicts serious bodily or mental injury upon
another person within his or her custody or physical control,
commits torture if he acts with knowledge that his actions would
cause cruel or extreme physical or mental pain or suffering. 
(2) As used in section (1)
(a) “ ‘Cruel’ means brutal, inhuman, sadistic, or that which
torments.”157
(b) “ ‘Custody or physical control’ means the forcible restric-
tion of a person’s movements or forcible confinement of the
person so as to interfere with that person’s liberty, without
that person’s consent or without lawful authority.”158 
(c) “Serious bodily injury” includes but is not limited to:
disfigurement, a fracture, burns or lacerations, mutilation,
maiming, stab or puncture wounds, multiple bruises or cuts,
forced ingestion of a dangerous substance, or internal inju-
ries. 
(d) “Serious mental injury” means a mental injury that
results in a substantial alteration of mental functioning,
which includes, but is not limited to, ongoing or recurring
nightmares, the existence of a phobia, depression or other
medically diagnosed psychological disorder, extended and
unremitting feelings of fear or anxiety, difficulty with physical
intimacy, loss of self-esteem, or insomnia. Expert testimony
as to the existence or extent of a mental injury is not a
requirement under this statute. A person’s special susceptibil-
ity to mental injury does not constitute an independent cause
of the injury such that a defendant is exonerated from
criminal liability.159
(3) Proof that a victim suffered pain is not an element of torture.
(4) A person acts with knowledge if he is aware that cruel phys-
ical or mental pain or suffering is virtually certain to follow from
his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result. 
157. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.85.
158. Id.
159. See Gonzin v. Commonwealth, 716 S.E.2d 466, 471 (Va. Ct. App. 2011). 
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(5) Torture shall be punishable as a class two felony with a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years.
The model statute’s first element is knowledge that one’s actions
are practically certain to cause cruel physical or mental pain. Just
as in Michigan, torture under the proposed model statute is a
specific intent crime. The prosecution must prove that the accused’s
actions were not only volitional but also that he was aware that his
wrongful actions were certain to cause cruel pain. This statute,
however, clearly sets out that the prosecution does not need to prove
that it was the goal or subjective desire of the accused to cause
severe pain. A person who negligently causes another to suffer cruel
pain would not be guilty of torture. Knowledge should be inferred
from the defendant’s actions with particular focus on the type of acts
and their duration or frequency.160 Proof that the victim suffered
pain is not required, and the extent of the victim’s injuries is
relevant to this analysis, but not determinative. As previously
mentioned, California defines torture as the infliction of pain “for
the purpose of revenge, extortion or persuasion.”161 However, a
purpose element is unnecessary. As long as the perpetrator acts
with knowledge that his actions will cause severe pain and suffer-
ing, his mental state is already sufficiently heinous and deserving
of heightened punishment. The perpetrator’s inflicting cruel pain,
however, may be additional probative evidence of his intent.162
The statute’s second element is the infliction of serious bodily or
mental injury. The injury does not need to be permanent. The
definition of “serious bodily injury” under the model statute is based
on the definition of “serious injury” under Virginia’s child abuse
statute.163 A statutory definition of serious bodily injury will not
only provide guidance to prosecutors and judges when determining
whether the assailant’s actions amount to torture, but will also put
future potential assailants on notice as to what kind of conduct the
statute prohibits. 
160. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
161. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2014).
162. See supra Part II.A. 
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (West 2014) (“For purposes of this subsection, ‘serious
injury’ shall include but not be limited to (i) disfigurement, (ii) a fracture, (iii) a severe burn
or laceration, (iv) mutilation, (v) maiming, forced ingestion of dangerous substances, or (vi)
life-threatening internal injuries.”). 
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As previously discussed in Part II, it is essential that the torture
statute includes mental pain and suffering because the most com-
mon consequence of torture is the victim’s mental and emotional
anguish.164 Consequently, a defendant may be convicted of torture
even if the victim does not sustain a serious physical injury, provid-
ed that the victim suffers a mental injury. As with bodily injury, the
model statute offers a helpful definition of “serious mental injury”
that comports with recent Virginia case law.165 Only long-lasting
and nontrivial mental injuries are sufficient under the statute.
Like Michigan, the Virginia state legislature should consider
limiting the reach of the statute’s mental component by stipulating
that the mental injury must result from a specific set of actions by
the defendant.166 Although mental pain and suffering can be just as
traumatic as physical pain, it can be more difficult to prove and has
the potential to be abused by victims and prosecutors. Restricting
the proscribed conduct which might cause mental pain limits the
possibility that victims may testify to false mental injuries. On the
other hand, the legislature should seriously consider adding to the
predicate acts. Mental pain and suffering resulting from sexual
torture and prolonged confinement with limited access to sensory
stimuli are not included in the list, but can have equally horrible
effects upon a victim’s mental health.167 
The final element to consider is control. The assailant has taken
steps to confine the victim by limiting her movements and cutting
off her access to outside help. The victim is at the mercy of the
perpetrator who forces the victim to endure or perform an act
against his or her will.168 The control element is essential to the
statute as it clearly differentiates the crime of torture from other
offenses, such as aggravated assault or malicious wounding.
Michigan’s definition of “physical or custodial control” is adequate
as it recognizes that the defendant can achieve physical control over
the victim in a variety of ways.169
164. See supra Part II.A. 
165. Gonzin v. Commonwealth, 716 S.E.2d 466, 471 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (interpreting the
meaning of “serious mental injury” under section 18.2-67.3). 
166. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
167. See Schechter, supra note 32, at 1250-52.
168. See Miller, supra note 143.
169. See supra Part II.E. 
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As for punishment, torture is a serious crime perpetrated by
dangerous individuals. It demands a serious punishment similar to
crimes that the Virginia criminal code designates as Class 2
felonies, such as unpremeditated murder,170 burglary with a deadly
weapon,171 and aggravated malicious wounding.172 Torture shares
many of the characteristics that make these crimes deserving of
such severe penalties: considerable violence, significant harm, and
most importantly, a criminal acting with an especially culpable
mindset. Under the model statute, the maximum punishment is life
in prison. The minimum punishment is ten years’ imprisonment.
Ten years is a mandatory minimum sentence, meaning judges
would not be able to sentence an individual and then suspend a
portion of the sentence so that the person serves less than ten years
in prison. This framework ensures that those convicted of torture
actually spend a minimum of ten years in prison.173 
IV. POTENTIAL CONCERNS WITH THE TORTURE STATUTE
A. Statutory Vagueness
One challenge with writing new statutes is ensuring that the
language of the law is specific enough to withstand a “void-for-
vagueness” challenge. In Virginia, a criminal statute withstands the
void-for-vagueness test if “(1) ordinary individuals are placed on
notice as to what behavior is proscribed, and (2) the language is
170. VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (West 2014). 
171. Id. § 18.2-89.
172. Id. § 18.2-51.2. 
173. One common argument against mandatory minimum sentencing is that it imposes a
“one-size-fits-all” approach that prevents judges from fitting the punishment to the individual
and the facts underlying their offense. What are Mandatory Minimums?, FAMILIES AGAINST
MANDATORY MINIMUMS http://famm.orgmandatory-minimums/ [http://perma.cc/G5WX-PHDH]
(last visited Sept. 10, 2014). Another argument is that mandatory minimums, especially as
applied to gun and drug violations, lead to an unnecessary rise in the prison population, which
is paired with increased costs to taxpayers. Id. Those concerns are minimal, if non-existent,
in the case of mandatory minimum sentencing for torture. The obvious differences between
drug offenders and torturers—the unlikelihood of reform and harm to society—underscore the
need for prolonged incapacitation. Judges also have sufficient discretion within the ten years
to life range to fit the punishment to the individual. Furthermore, torture is rare. The number
of convicts and the cost of housing those convicts will most likely be low. See, e.g., MICH.
HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, supra note 1 (predicting that a torture statute would likely have a
minimal fiscal impact). 
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specific enough so that it does not unduly encourage arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement.”174 California’s torture statute has
repeatedly passed an identical two-pronged vagueness test.175 In
People v. Aguilar, the defendant contended that the phrase “cruel
pain” was unconstitutionally vague because “no one knows what
‘cruel pain’ is.”176 The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that
“cruel” when used as a modifier of “pain” is commonly understood to
mean extreme or severe pain.177 The defendant in that case also
contended that the term “torture” was vague “because the statute
[did] not include as an element the intent to inflict extreme and
prolonged pain.”178 The California court looked to the dictionary
definition of torture as well as prior case law and determined that
neither source indicated that torture required the prolonged
infliction of pain.179 Based on this finding, the court held that
“torture” was not unconstitutionally vague.180
Although California case law may be only moderately persuasive
in Virginia, the fact that California courts upheld a much more
broadly worded statute than the one proposed in this Note is highly
suggestive that the proposed torture statute should withstand a
vagueness challenge. California’s torture statute only defines one
term, “great bodily injury.”181 Conversely, the statute proposed by
this Note provides detailed definitions of each of the major terms in
the statute—“cruel,” “serious physical or mental injury,” and
“physical control”—so as to give people more than sufficient notice
of what conduct the statute proscribes.
Of course, for a statute to be truly effective it must aspire to a
higher level of specificity than the minimal vagueness standard. In
her critique of federal criminal torture laws, Sarah St. Vincent
174. Brewster v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 288, 289 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). 
175. People v. Misa, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (Ct. App. 2006) (holding that California’s torture
statute is not unconstitutionally vague becasue an ordinary person can understand what
conduct it prohibits); People v. Aguilar, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the
phrase “cruel or extreme pain and suffering” and the meaning of “sadistic purpose” are not
unconstitutionally vague); People v. Barrera, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that torture statute’s use of the term “extortion” is not vague). 
176. Aguilar, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621. 
177. Id. at 622. 
178. Id. at 623 (alteration in original). 
179. Id. at 623-24.
180. Id. at 624. 
181. CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2014).
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argues that the U. S. government should scrap its broadly-worded
torture statute and instead criminalize specific methods of
torture.182 At the national level this makes sense. Because the
statute applies to state actors—CIA interrogators, prison guards,
and so forth—it is important that they be given definitive guidelines
of what types of interrogation methods constitute torture, so they
can operate with the certainty that their actions will not expose
them to criminal liability.183 Furthermore, there are common and
well-recognized forms of enhanced interrogation methods that state
actors utilize.184 Within the domestic legal context, on the other
hand, the lines of morality are more defined. The concern is less
about limiting liability and more about giving the states effective
tools to combat crime. An exhaustive list of what actions constitute
torture risks being underinclusive and would only tie the hands of
prosecutors. Conversely, a statute that sets forth extensive defini-
tions of the kinds of injuries the victim must suffer strikes a
balance. It provides sufficient notice to future defendants while also
giving prosecutors sufficient leeway to prosecute a variety of actions
that may constitute torture.
B. Risk of Minimizing the Seriousness of Torture
When attempting to categorize or statutorily define a crime such
as torture, which lacks clearly defined parameters and has subjec-
tive elements in how it is perceived, there is an inherent risk of min-
imizing or distorting the seriousness of the crime. In describing his
threshold test for obscenity, Justice Potter Stewart famously wrote:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material
I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description
[hardcore pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion
picture involved in this case is not that.185
182. St. Vincent, supra note 32, at 815-18.
183. See id. at 846.
184. See id. at  833 (“Worldwide, coercive interrogations in countries with profound political
and cultural dissimilarities tend to involve surprisingly similar methods. Many of these
methods are physical, including beating, stress positions, electric shock, starvation, rape, and
suffocation or asphyxiation.”).
185. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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In many ways torture is like obscenity: difficult to define, but in
most cases there is general agreement on what it is. Prosecutors and
judges should keep this in mind when deciding to bring or dismiss
charges of torture. Although a particular case may meet the basic
elements of torture as it is statutorily defined, the charge should be
reserved for only those instances of truly heinous and inhuman
conduct. There will be a need to walk a line that recognizes the
distinction between torture and less serious crimes.
V. APPLICATION OF MODEL TORTURE STATUTE TO GORE
The horrific actions taken by Brian and Shannon Gore against
their baby girl satisfy the elements of the torture statute proposed
by this Note. First, the Gores’ course of conduct, and the number
and extent of the child’s injuries, demonstrate that the Gores knew
they were causing their child to suffer both cruel physical and
mental pain. The Gores admitted to locking their child in a
cramped, makeshift cage in the back of their home.186 This was not
an isolated incident resulting from a brief lapse in judgment. The
feces in the cage as well as the child’s leg contractures suggest she
was stuck in the same position for an extended period of time.
Despite having the resources to feed and care for the child, the
Gores watched as their baby girl wasted away from hunger. As a
result, the child suffered multiple injuries including brain damage,
bruising, skeletal contractures, and untold psychological harm. The
Gores’ statements that they caged their daughter essentially
because she had been unruly and difficult to care for further suggest
that they knowingly tortured their daughter.187 Notwithstanding
any of the Gores’ stated reasons for caging and starving their child,
the Gores’ actions by themselves would be sufficient to establish
knowledge under the statute.
Second, the physical injuries the child suffered meet the defini-
tion of “serious bodily injury” as defined by the statute. Under the
186. See supra Introduction. 
187. These statements by the Gores suggest that they may have caged their daughter for
the purpose of punishment—either for bad behavior or because they resented her existence.
In California, this would be evidence of motive and could possibly be enough to secure a
conviction for torture under section 206. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 206 (West 2014). 
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statute it is not necessary that the victim suffers a permanent
injury. Consequently, even if the child had not sustained permanent
brain damage, her other physical injuries were sufficiently serious
to constitute serious bodily injury.188 The bruising and open sores
covering her body constitute extensive bruising and the contractions
of the bones in her legs and skull as a result of confinement and
malnutrition certainly qualify as serious bodily injuries.
There was also sufficient evidence to conclude that the child suf-
fered mental injuries. The doctors testified that the child will always
have cognitive deficiencies as well emotional, behavioral, and psycho-
logical challenges, and will never be able to live independently.
Finally, the control element is easily met. The Gores physically
restricted the child’s movements by locking her in a cage. The child
was completely at the mercy of her parents, and the Gores’ status as
the child’s parents did not give them lawful authority to unreason-
ably confine their child.189 The Gores’ actions clearly meet all the
elements under the proposed torture statute.
CONCLUSION
Torture is not a crime reserved exclusively for unscrupulous
interrogators and other Machiavellian state actors willing to break
all the rules. Career criminals, husbands, wives, and—as the tragic
case in Gloucester County, Virginia, shows—even parents are cap-
able of torture. Unfortunately, many states’ criminal codes do not
equip prosecutors with the statutory tools they need to effectively
punish torturous conduct. Michigan is the exception. California’s
penal code fails to recognize that torture does not require a discern-
ible purpose separate and apart from the knowledge that one’s
actions are causing cruel suffering. States without torture statutes,
such as Virginia, should follow Michigan’s lead and adopt torture
statutes that criminalize mental as well as physical torture. Motive
should not be an element of the crime, and the statute should pro-
vide detailed, but non-exclusive, definitions of key terms. A flexible
but specific torture statute that clearly outlines the conduct it seeks
to proscribe will close a glaring gap in Virginia’s criminal law thus
188. See supra Introduction.
189. See supra Part II.E. 
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protecting many of Virginia’s most vulnerable citizens from its most
dangerous criminals.
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